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INFORMATION GEOMETRY AND EVOLUTIONARY
GAME THEORY
MARC HARPER
Abstract. The Shahshahani geometry of evolutionary game the-
ory is realized as the information geometry of the simplex, deriving
from the Fisher information metric of the manifold of categorical
probability distributions. Some essential concepts in evolutionary
game theory are realized information-theoretically. Results are ex-
tended to the Lotka-Volterra equation and to multiple population
systems.
1. Introduction
The replicator equation is a widely-used model of natural selection.
This paper explains the realization of the geometry of evolutionary
game theory in terms of information theoretical principles, giving a
purely mathematical and statistical origination of the replicator equa-
tion. Under this interpretation, the replicator equation models the
information dynamics of a population of replicating entities. Addi-
tionally, the Kullback-Liebler information divergence, which serves as
a Lyapunov function for the replicator dynamic, can be interpreted as
a measure potential information, characterizing the concept of evolu-
tionary stable state informatically.
1.1. Continuous Replicator Dynamic. Consider a categorical dis-
tribution X on n categories of entities in a population. This is dis-
crete probability distribution represented by a unit vector of n vari-
ables x = (x1, . . . , xn) under the normalization |x| = x1+ · · ·+ xn = 1,
where xi denotes the proportion of the i-th type in the population. The
replicator equation on this distribution is the differential equation
x˙i = xi
(
fi(x)− f¯(x)
)
,
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where f(x) = (f1(x), . . . , fn(x)) is a fitness landscape and f¯(x) =
x1f1(x) + · · ·+ xnfn(x) is the mean fitness.
2. Geometric Aspects of Evolutionary Game Theory
The information theoretic interpretations of the previous chapter
have a unified basis in information geometry. We begin with a descrip-
tion of the geometry of the simplex and geometric results known in
evolutionary game theory.
2.1. The Geometry of the Simplex. Let Sn be the interior of the
n-simplex ∆n, which is (n− 1)-dimensional. Each point x of the sim-
plex has the property that x1+· · ·+xn = 1, so the tangent space at any
point on the interior is the (n− 1)-dimensional vector space described
by n vectors v1, . . . , vn such that v1+· · ·+vn = 0. The orthogonal com-
plement of the tangent space is the one dimensional line with direction
vector 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1). Indeed 1 · v = 0 for any v in the tangent space
and the complement is necessarily one-dimensional. The faces of ∆n
are isomorphic to a simplex of one lower dimension, which can be seen
by setting one of the xi to zero and indicates the absence of that type
in the population. The replicator equation is forward-invariant on the
simplex (and hence each of its faces), since if xi = 0 then x˙i = 0. Be-
cause of this property, the replicator equation is called non-innovative
since new types cannot arise, in contrast to evolutionary dynamics in
which this is possible (notably the replicator-mutator equation [10] and
the orthogonal projection dynamic [12]).
2.2. Shahshahani Geometry. Shahshahani introduced two Riemann-
ian manifolds into mathematical biology [13]: the positive orthant of
R
n, denoted Rn+, with the metric
gij(x) =
|x|
xi
δij ,
where |x| =
∑
i xi and the restriction to the simplex ∆
n = {x ∈
R
n | |x| = 1, xi ≥ 0 ∀i} ⊂ R
n
+, with the metric
gij(x) =
1
xi
δij .
Call the latter manifold the Shahshahani manifold; its metric is known
as the Shahshahani metric. There is a normalization map N : Rn+ →
∆n given by x 7→ x
|x|
. For each τ ∈ R+, there is a map ϕτ mapping the
simplex into Rn+ by x 7→ τx. These maps are sections of the normaliza-
tion map since N ◦ϕτ = id∆n . The Shahshahani metric diverges on the
boundary of the simplex so the metric is valid only on the interior Sn.
INFORMATION GEOMETRY AND EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY 3
Dynamics that are forward-invariant, such as the replicator dynamic,
are not affected by the discontinuity at the boundary.
2.3. The Replicator Dynamic, Geometrically. The geometry of
the Shahshahani manifold yields an elegant interpretation of the repli-
cator equation: it is the gradient flow of the Shahshahani metric.
Shahshahani proved the result for a special case of the replicator equa-
tion; the following more general theorem comes from [8].
Theorem 1. If the differential equation x˙i = fi(x) is a Euclidean
gradient with fi =
∂V
∂xi
then the replicator equation xi = fˆi(x) =
xi(fi(x)− f¯(x)) is a gradient with respect to the Shahshahani metric.
In the case that the fitness landscape is a Euclidean gradient, the
Shahshahani gradient gives a Lyapunov function for the dynamic. The
classical case is that of a symmetric matrix A and fitness landscape
f(x) = Ax, where A is the matrix of Malthusian fitness parameters
given by the difference in birth rates and death rates aij = bij − dij of
an individual having alleles i and j, where the alleles are of a single
gene locus. In this case the Shahshahani potential is the mean fitness
1
2
x · f(x) = 1
2
x · Ax, with Ax the Euclidean gradient [8, 13].
2.4. Fisher’s Fundamental Theorem and Kimura’s Maximal
Principle. Fisher’s fundamental theorem is a consequence of the geo-
metric approach.
Theorem 2. The rate of change of the Shahshahani potential is equal
to the variance of the fitness landscape [8].
V˙ (x) = Varx[f(x)].
This is a general version of Fisher’s Fundamental Theorem of Nat-
ural Selection, specializing to the traditional result in the case of a
symmetric and linear fitness landscape [8]. Kimura’s maximal prin-
ciple follows from the fact that the replicator equation is a gradient
flow [13]. As these are both important results in mathematical biol-
ogy emerging from the geometry, an interpretation is desired of the
Shahshahani metric that provides intuition for the introduced geome-
try on the simplex in the context of modeling natural selection.
3. The Information Geometry of Natural Selection
An intuitive interpretation of the Shahshahani geometry is provided
by information theory. Information geometry [5] studies manifolds of
probability distributions p(s, x) on a set S depending on parameters x,
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which are the coordinates of the manifold. The manifold is endowed
with the Fisher information metric,
gij(x) = E
[
∂ log p
∂xi
∂ log p
∂xj
]
which can be shown to be the unique (up to a constant) metric respect-
ing sufficient statistics [7].
3.1. The Fisher Information Metric is the Shahshahani Metric.
The manifold of immediate interest is P (X), the set of categorical
probability distributions on a finite set X , with the Fisher information
metric. In this case, it is convenient to abuse notation by allowing the
parameters x and distribution variables s to have the same symbolic
representation. 1 There is a natural mapping ϕ : P (X) → ∆n, where
|X| = n, given by p→ (p(1), p(2), . . . , p(n)) = (x1, . . . , xn). This maps
P (X) isometrically onto the simplex, and an easy computation shows
that that the Fisher information metric is induced by the Shahshahani
metric under this mapping. Simply observe that
gij(x) = E
[
∂ log x
∂xi
∂ log x
∂xj
]
=
∑
k
xk
1
xi
δik
1
xj
δjk =
1
xi
δij
This result was recognized in [4] and [6].
3.2. Fisher’s Fundamental Theorem. Fisher’s fundamental theo-
rem is built into the geometry of P (X) [5]. Define the maps E[g] on
P (X) by p 7→ Ep[g], where g is from the set of functions R
X = {g :
X → R} and Ep is the mean taken at the distribution p. Similarly, let
Vp[g] denote the variance of the function g at p.
Theorem 3. For any g : X → R ∈ RX ,
Vp = ||(dE[g])p||
2
p = ||(∇E[g])p||
2
p,
where the norm is induced by the Fisher information metric, for all
p ∈ P (X).
1Different coordinates are sometimes chosen in information geometry for P (X),
letting (for instance) xn+1 = 1 −
∑
n
i=1
xi to enforce
∑
i
xi = 1. This yields an
asymmetric set of replicator equations, so a different set of coordinates is chosen in
this exposition.
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3.3. Information Divergences and Metrics on P (X). Some Rie-
mannian metrics on P (X) can be derived from information diver-
gences [5]. Information geometry defines an information divergence
as a smooth function D(·||·) : P (X) × P (X) such that D(x||y) ≥ 0
with equality iff x = y. The second order Taylor expansion in either
variable evaluated along the diagonal x = y begins with the Hessian
term H . Indeed,
D(x||y) = D(x||y)|x=y + (∇D(x||y)|x=y) · (x− y) +
1
2
· (x− y)TH(x) · (x− y) + · · ·
= 0 + 0 +
1
2
· (x− y)TH(x) · (x− y) + · · ·
because the gradient is parallel to 1 and 1 · (x − y) = 1 · x − 1 · y =
1− 1 = 0.
In the case that the Hessian is positive definite, it can be used to
define a metric,
g
(D)
ij =
(
∂2D
∂xi∂yj
)
|x=y.
A metric then defines a gradient flow, hence a global information
divergence yields a dynamical system on the simplex. Importantly, the
Hessian of the Kullback-Liebler divergence (in either variable, evalu-
ated on the diagonal) is the Fisher information matrix, yielding the
local to global connection of these two measures of information.
Example 4 (Kullback-Liebler Divergence). The Kullback-Liebler di-
vergence localizes to the Fisher information metric. In coordinates we
obtain the Shahshahani metric since
∂2
∂xi∂yj
DKL(x||y)|x=y =
1
xi
δij .
Hence the induced gradient flow is the replicator equation. This allows
the interpretation of Fisher’s Fundamental theorem and Kimura’s max-
imal principle in terms of Fisher information: natural selection forms a
gradient with respect to an informatic measure, and hence locally has
the direction of maximal information increase. The rate of change of
the mean fitness of the population is given by the informatic variance.
3.4. Kullback-Liebler Divergence is a Lyapunov function for
the Replicator Dynamic. The following theorem shows that the
Kullback-Liebler information divergence forms a Lyapunov function for
the replicator dynamic, given an evolutionarily stable state. In fact,
evolutionary stability is characterized by this property. A version of
this theorem was proved in [1] and in [3].
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Theorem 5. The state xˆ is an interior ESS for the replicator dynamic
if and only if DKL(xˆ||x) is a local Lyapunov function.
Proof. Let V (x) = DKL(xˆ||x) =
∑
i xˆi log xˆi −
∑
i xˆi log xi. Then we
have that
V˙ (x) = −
∑
i
xˆi
x˙i
xi
= −
∑
i
xˆi(fi(x)− f¯(x))
= −
∑
i
xˆifi(x) +
∑
i
xˆif¯(x) = −
∑
i
xˆifi(x) +
(∑
i
xˆi
)
f¯(x)
= −
∑
i
xˆifi(x) + f¯(x) = −(xˆ · f(x)− x · f(x)) < 0.
The last inequality holds if and only if xˆ is an ESS. Finally, by Jensen’s
inequality, DKL is minimized when x = xˆ, so it is a local Lyapunov
function. 
A similar result is proven in [8], with the Lyapunov function V (x) =∏
i x
xˆi
i , but the informatic origin is not apparent in this form, although
the quantity V can be interpreted as the probability of finding a cat-
egorical distribution on x in the state xˆ. The quantity DKL(xˆ||x) can
be described as the potential information of the replicator system. The
above result can then be interpreted information theoretically – natural
selection acts to minimize the potential information.
Theorem 5 holds for a class of ecological dynamics. A dynamic of the
form x˙i = xigi(x), i = 1, . . . , n (an ecological dynamic) is called aggre-
gate monotone with respect to a fitness landscape f if g = (g1, . . . , gn)
has the property that y·f(x) > z·f(x) if and only if y·g(x) > z·g(x), for
all distributions x, y, z. An aggregate monotone dynamic is the replica-
tor dynamic up to a change in velocity [11]. In particular, the replicator
equation with a convex function applied to the fitness landscape is ag-
gregate monotone. Consider the following extension of Theorem 5.
Theorem 6. For an aggregate monotone ecological dynamic x˙i = xigi(x),
DKL(xˆ||x) is a Lyapunov function for the dynamic if xˆ is an interior
ESS.
Proof. Let V (x) = DKL(xˆ||x) =
∑
i xˆi log xˆi −
∑
i xˆi log xi. Note that
since x˙i = xigi(x) is a dynamic on the simplex, 0 =
∑
i xigi(x) =
x · g(x). Then we have that
V˙ (x) = −
∑
i
xˆi
x˙i
xi
= −
∑
i
xˆigi(x)
= −xˆ · g(x) = −(xˆ · g(x)− x · g(x))
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Applying aggregate monotonicity to the last equality completes the
proof. 
Since a change of velocity does not alter the orbits of the dynamic,
Theorem 6 shows that the replicator equation is essentially the only
aggregate monotone ecological dynamic in which evolutionary stability
corresponds to minimizing the Kullback-Liebler divergence. For ex-
actly which class of evolutionary dynamics this property holds for is
an open question. From the proof it is clear that the assumption of
aggregate monotonicity is too strong for a full characterization since it
is only needed that xˆ · g(x) − x · g(x) > 0 if xˆ · f(x) − x · f(x) > 0,
which quantifies over two distributions rather than three.
3.5. Exponential Families as Solutions of the Replicator Equa-
tion. The exponential map on the Shahshahani manifold is
exp(x, v) =
∑
i
xie
vi∑
j xje
vj
eˆi,
where eˆi is the i-th coordinate vector [6]. The exponential map reduces
to the exponential family at the barycenter b = ( 1
n
, . . . , 1
n
),
exp(b, v) =
∑
i
1
n
evi∑
j
1
n
evj
eˆi =
1∑
j e
vj
(ev1 , . . . , evn).
The solutions of the replicator equation can be realized as exponen-
tial families [2, 6, 9]. Let xi = exp(vi − G) with v˙i = fi(x) and G(x)
a normalization constant to ensure that the distribution sums to one.
From the fact that
∑
i xi = 1, 0 =
∑
i x˙i and so
0 =
∑
i
x˙i =
∑
i
exp(vi(x)−G(x))(v˙i(x)− G˙(x))
=
∑
i
xi(v˙i(x)− G˙(x)) =
∑
i
(xifi(x))− G˙(x)
= f¯(x)− G˙(x)
Hence G˙ = f¯(x). Now xi satisfies
x˙i = exp(vi(x)−G(x))(v˙i(x)− G˙(x)) = xi(fi(x)− f¯(x)),
which is the replicator equation. In the case of a log-linear fitness land-
scape, explicit solutions can be derived [6]. In this case, the equation
for the variable v can be reduced to a linear differential equation, which
can be solved with eigenvalue methods.
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3.6. Denormalization. Information geometry defines the denormal-
ized manifold P˜ (X) = {τp|τ ∈ R+, p ∈ P (X)}, which can be thought
of as non-normalized discrete probability distributions. As with P (X),
P˜ (X) has an information metric. The denormalized manifold embeds
into the reals as Rn+, with the denormalized information metric induced
by the the metric given by Shahshahani, where the mapping back onto
P (X) realizes τ as |x|. In coordinates, the metric is given by
g˜ij(x) = τgij(x) =
τ
xi
δij ,
Akin uses the metric
gij(x) =
1
xi
δij
on Rn+ rather than the metric
gij(x) =
|x|
xi
δij
given by Shahshahani [2, 13]. Both metrics restrict to the same met-
ric given by Shahshahani on the simplex. From the point of view of
information geometry, the metric given by Shahshahani is the natural
choice. The choice affects the form of the gradient on Rn+, which is in
the case of Akin’s metric is the Lotka-Volterra predator-prey equation.
3.7. The Lotka-Volterra Equations and the Replicator Equa-
tion. The Lotka-Volterra equations
(1) x˙i = xifi(x)
descend from Rn+, through a normalization map onto the simplex, to
a replicator equation with an altered landscape. To see this, let |x| =
x1 + · · · + xn, x˙i = xifi(x) and yi =
xi
|x|
. Rearrange to |x|yi = xi and
note that d
dt
|x| =
∑
i x˙i =
∑
i xifi(x) = x · f(x). By the product rule,
d
dt
|x|yi + |x|y˙i = x˙i and so
d
dt
yi =
x˙i −
d
dt
|x|y˙i
|x|
=
xifi(x)− x · f(x)yi
|x|
= yi(fi(x)− y · f(x))
= yi(gi(y)− y · g(y)),
where gi(y) = fi(x) is an alteration of the fitness landscape.
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The Lotka-Volterra equations are the gradient flow with respect to
the metric given by Akin on Rn+ [8]. The gradient of the metric given
by Shahshahani differs by a factor of |x|:
(2) x˙i =
xi
|x|
fi(x),
This system is transformable to Equation 1 after a change of velocity
eliminating the scalar function B(x) = 1
|x|
because B is strictly pos-
itive on Rn+. Equation 2 transforms to a replicator equation via the
normalization map [13].
The Lotka-Volterra equations can be interpreted as a gradient of
the denormalized Fisher information metric, in the case that f is an
Euclidean metric, in analogy to the replicator equation. This allows
denormalized analogues of earlier results, such as the following, which
is true for the denormalized version of the Lotka-Volterra equation.
Theorem 7. Let xˆ in Rn+ be such that
xˆ · f(x)
|xˆ|
>
x · f(x)
|x|
in some neighborhood of xˆ (a denormalized ESS). Suppose that the
trajectory of x˙i =
xi
|x|
fi(x) lies in a set that contains no point parallel
to xˆ. Then the denormalized Kullback-Liebler divergence
DKL
(
xˆ
|xˆ|
||
x
|x|
)
is a local Lyapunov function for Equation 2.
Proof. The divergence is minimal (and equal to zero) when x = cxˆ for
some constant c. Hence if the line through the origin and the point xˆ
intersects the the trajectory at most once, the divergence is zero if and
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only if xˆ = x. The time derivative is
d
dt
[
DKL
(
xˆ
|xˆ|
||
x
|x|
)]
= 0−
d
dt
[∑
i
xˆi
|xˆ|
(log xi − log |x|)
]
= −
∑
i
xˆi
|xˆ|
x˙i
xi
+
∑
i
xˆi
|xˆ|
˙|x|
|x|
= −
∑
i
xˆi
|xˆ|
1
xi
xi
|x|
fi(x) +
x · f(x)
|x|2
= −
1
|x|
∑
i
xˆi
|xˆ|
fi(x) +
1
|x|2
x · f(x)
= −
1
|x|
(
xˆ · f(x)
|xˆ|
−
x · f(x)
|x|
)
< 0.

4. Informatics of Multiple Population Replicator
Dynamics
The information-theoretic approach easily extends to multiple pop-
ulation replicator equations such as bimatrix games. As before, the
potential information plays a crucial role. It is the sum of the poten-
tial informations of all populations that plays the role of the Lyapunov
function and gives rise to the geometry. It suffices to discuss the two
population case as it is clear that the results extend inductively to
finitely-many populations.
4.1. Two Populations. Consider two categorical distributions p =
(p1, . . . , pn) and q = (qn+1, . . . , qn+m) with fitness landscapes f(p, q) =
(f1(p, q), . . . , fn(p, q)) and g(p, q) = (gn+1(p, q), . . . , gn+m(p, q)). Define
the coupled replicator system
p˙i = pi(fi(p, q)− Ep [f(p, q)])
q˙j = qj(gj(p, q)− Eq [g(p, q)])
where i runs from 1 to n and j runs from n+1 to n+m. Note carefully
that the expected values are taken with each distribution respectively.
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This system is the gradient flow of the Riemannian metric defined
on the interior of ∆n ×∆m given by
Gi,j(p, q) =


1
pi
if i = j ≤ n
1
qi
if i = j > n
0 else
That is, the matrix is the direct sum matrix of the usual metric for
each equation. As in the single population case, we can use potential
information to form a Lyapunov function for the system. Given states pˆ
and qˆ, let L be the sum of the potential information of each categorical
distribution. That is,
L = Dp(pˆ, p) +Dq(qˆ, q)
=
∑
i
pˆi log pˆi −
∑
i
pˆi log pi +
∑
j
qˆj log qˆj −
∑
j
qˆj log qj
The metric can be obtained as the localization of the sum of the
divergence functions. All the usual calculations follow from the fact
that the system is a gradient, e.g. Fisher’s Fundamental Theorem.
4.2. Potential Information is a Lyapunov Function. Recall that
pˆ is an ESS in the single population case if pˆ · f(p) > p · f(p) for all p
in a neighborhood of pˆ.
Theorem 8. If pˆ and qˆ are ESS for each system respectively then L is
a Lyapunov function for the coupled system.
Proof. A straight-forward computation shows that (up to a negative)
L˙ = pˆ · f(p, q)− p · f(p, q) + qˆ · g(p, q)− q · g(p, q).
L is positive everywhere and has minimum at (pˆ, qˆ). Since pˆ and qˆ are
ESS, L˙ < 0, so L is a local Lyapunov function. 
Notice that the hypothesis that both pˆ and qˆ are ESS is too strong.
Indeed, all that is required is that
pˆ · f(p, q) + qˆ · g(p, q) > p · f(p, q) + q · g(p, q).
Call this condition a coupled ESS (as well as its obvious higher dimen-
sional analogs) and note that any ESS is a coupled ESS. Then L is a
Lyapunov for the system if and only if (pˆ and qˆ) is a coupled ESS for
the two population system.
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4.3. Solutions. We can again show that the solutions are exponential
families. Let v˙ = f(p, q) and w˙ = g(p, q). Let N˙ = Ep [f(p, q)] and
M˙ = Eq [g(p, q)]. Then pi = exp (vi −N) and qj = exp (wj −M) is a
solution to the coupled system. Indeed,
p˙i = exp (vi −N)(v˙i − N˙) = pi(fi(p, q)− Ep [f(p, q)]),
and similarly for qj .
4.4. Multiple Populations. The above generalizes by induction to
show that for a coupled system of multiple interacting populations, the
sum of the respective potential informations gives a Lyapunov function
for a coupled ESS.
5. Discussion
The Shahshahani geometry can be interpreted within the framework
of information theory as the information geometry of the simplex. This
explains the origin of several quantities in evolutionary game theory
including the Shahshahani metric and the Kullback-Liebler informa-
tion divergence. An important feature of the approach is that the
information-geometric reasoning extends to the Lotka-Volterra equa-
tion and the multiple population replicator equation easily within the
framework. Additionally, the replicator dynamic arises intuitively from
purely mathematical and statistical concepts such as Fisher informa-
tion. This shows that the replicator equation models the information
dynamics of natural selection.
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